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Abstract There is growing evidence that not all experimental subjects understand
their strategic environment. We introduce a ‘‘choice process’’ (CP) protocol that aids
in identifying these subjects. This protocol elicits in an incentive compatible manner
provisional choices as players internalize their decision making environment. We
implement the CP protocol in the modified 2/3 guessing game and use it to pinpoint
players that are naive by identifying those who make weakly dominated choices some
time into the play. At all time horizons these players average close to 50. This is
consistent with the assumption in Level-K theory that the least sophisticated subjects
(the naive ones) play uniformly over the [1–100] action space. In contrast, sophisti-
cated players show evidence of increased understanding as time passes. We find that
the CP protocol mirrors play in multiple setups with distinct time constraints. Hence it
may be worth deploying more broadly to understand the interaction between decision
time and choice.
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1 Introduction
Not all experimental subjects fully understand the decision making environments in
which they are placed. A striking indication of this can be found in the auction
setting, in which Ivanov et al. (2010) find that many subjects are unable to best-
respond even to their own past play. Similarly, Agranov et al. (2012) find that
roughly 50 % of the subjects are unable to pick rationally when playing against a
computer whose strategy they have been told.1
Given how prevalent they may be, it is important to identify players who are
unaware of their decision making environment. We introduce a ‘‘choice process’’
(CP) protocol that helps identifying these players and apply it to the 2/3 guessing
game (Nagel 1995; Stahl 1996; Ho et al. 1998; Camerer et al. 2004). In this game, all
players choose a number between 0 and 100 and the winner is the person whose
number is closest to 2/3 of the average of the numbers that were chosen by the people
in the experiment. ‘‘Level-K’’ theory has been applied to this game to account for the
significant clustering around 33 and 22 when 0 is the only Nash Equilibrium. This
theory assumes that naive ‘‘level zero’’ (L0) players make choices that are uniformly
distributed over the range [0, 100], hence averaging 50. Sophisticated type L2 players
who pick numbers close to 22 are interpreted as best responding to type L1 players,
who pick 33 in response to the assumed average of 50 associated with naive play.
However, sophistication is not revealed by final choices alone: 33 could be the result
of a random choice or the best response to a belief that others are averaging 50.
To overcome this identification problem, we study decision problem that mirrors
the essence of the 2/3 guessing game described above. Subjects in our experiment are
playing against a group of subjects who have played the standard 2/3 guessing game in
the past, and, are rewarded if their selected number is closer to the 2/3 of the average
number chosen by those who played the game in the past. Importantly, in addition to
measuring the final choice, our CP protocol measures players’ provisional choices in
the 3 min period after the task is conveyed to them. The procedure is simple: subjects
make choices over a period of time and which choice matters for payment is randomly
determined. Since it is no longer only the final choice that is potentially rewarded,
subjects are incentivized to make what they perceive as the best decision at each point
in time. Since it measures choices alone and is incentive compatible, it may be easier
to map to theory than verbal reports, mouse-clicks, and physiological data of the sort
that is increasingly being used to identify strategic awareness.2
We identify naive subjects in the game as those players who make weakly
dominated choices (above 64) after having had some time to consider the decision.3
1 See also Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008) who find that subjects’ reported beliefs are often not
consistent with chosen actions in two-person simultaneous games and De Sousa et al. (2014) who find
that a sizable fraction of highly ranked chess players behave non-strategically in rather simple
experimental settings.
2 We survey other choice procedure methods in the Online Appendix.
3 In our setup, action 100 is strictly dominated, while all actions between 65 and 99 are weakly
dominated as there exists a strategy (playing 64 against seven other players playing between 65 and 99)
which does as well or better for all possible states of the world.
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We find a high proportion of such naive players (approximately 45 %).4 Consistent
with assumptions made in most empirical papers, we find that these players make
final choices that average close to 50, and do so during much of the 3 min
observation period. Our method allows us to categorize and identify naive players
prior to testing best response dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design can
be found in Sect. 2. Results concerning the prevalence and patterns of naive and
sophisticated play are in Sect. 3. We discuss the connection between the CP protocol
and series of time-constrained tasks in Sect. 4. Concluding remarks are in Sect. 5.
2 The experimental design
Experiments were conducted at the laboratory of the Center for Experimental Social
Science (CESS) at New York University with participants drawn from the general
undergraduate population. Given our interest in how learning takes place in a novel
one shot game, in each session subjects performed a 2/3 guessing task one time only
and we dropped subjects who reported being familiar with guessing game in a
questionnaire conducted at the end of the experiment. Our sample consists of 188
subjects after removing about 25 % of subjects who had either played the game or
heard of it. All sessions lasted no longer than 40 min and subjects earned between
$10 and $15.
We conducted three different treatments: the control treatment of 30 s, the
control treatment of 180 s and the CP treatment. Full instructions for the CP
treatment are presented in the Online Appendix. In all treatments, the rules of the
game and the task were as follows:
Rules of the game A few days ago eight undergraduate students like
yourselves played the following game. Each of the 8 students had 180 s to
choose an integer between 1 and 100 inclusive, which they wrote on a piece of
paper. After 180 s, we collected the papers. The winner was the person whose
number was closest to two thirds of the average of everyone’s numbers. That
is, the eight students played among themselves and their goal was to guess two
thirds of the average of everyone’s numbers. The winner won $10 and in case
of a tie the prize was split.
Your task You will have 30 (180) s to choose an integer between 1 and 100
inclusive. You win $10 if you are ‘‘better than’’ those eight students at
determining two thirds of the average of their numbers. That is, you win $10 if
your number is the closest to two thirds of the average of the numbers in the
past game.
We indeed conducted an 8-player ‘‘standard’’ guessing game prior to these series
of experiments and used the data in the way described to the subjects in this current
paper.
4 See Agranov et al. (2012) for a different method of estimating the proportion of naive players in the
population.
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In all sessions, the screen displayed 100 buttons, each representing an integer
between 1 and 100 inclusive.5 In the control treatment, only the final choice of each
subject mattered for payment. The control treatment sessions differed in the amount
of time given to subjects to make their choice: 30 or 180 s. During available time
subjects were free to select buttons as many times as they wished but only the final
number they chose affected their payment. The longer time of 180 s was chosen
since prior work suggests that it is enough time for most subjects to reason through
the game, while the shorter time of 30 s was chosen to cut short such reasoning. We
conducted these control sessions not only to gauge the importance of decision time
in the outcome of the game, but also to provide benchmarks with which to compare
the main CP treatment. In total, 66 subjects participated in the 30 s control treatment
and 62 participated in the 180 s control treatment.
Our main treatment, the CP treatment, lasted for 180 s and included 60 subjects.
In CP treatment, subject’s payment was determined based on the number selected by
subject at a random second; the exact second that mattered for payment was drawn
by the computer at the end of the task and, thus, not known in advance to subjects.
In other words, it was a choice of a subject at a random second that was compared to
the choices of eight subjects that played the game previous to the experiment. The
CP payment mechanism incentivizes subjects to make a quick and intuitive first
estimate of two-thirds of the average final number picked by the group that had
played the guessing game previously. Whenever further reflection causes this best
estimate to change, subjects are incentivized immediately to make the correspond-
ing change in their guess to reduce the likelihood that their previous guess (which
they came to realize was inferior to the current estimate) be chosen for payment.
2.1 Discussion of the CP methodology
The main advantages of the CP protocol is that it is a choice experiment, which is
simple to explain to subjects and it allows to elicit in an incentive compatible
manner the whole path of individual thought in addition to the final choice. One
may, however, wonder if this protocol nudges subjects to change their guesses
beyond their natural inclination to do so given that instructions emphasize that
subjects can change their estimates as often as they wish. Our results presented in
Sect. 4 show that the CP protocol does not suffer from demand effect of this sort
(see Figure 2 in Online Appendix which presents the distribution of subjects’ final
choices in the CP and in the control treatment).
Another potential concern is probability matching—the tendency of some people
to probability match and choose actions proportionally especially in the environ-
ments in which the best action is probabilistic (see Rubinstein 2002). Such behavior
may be exaggerated by the CP protocol if subjects are uncertain about the average
number chosen by the eight players that played the game previously since subjects
are asked to make the same choice over and over (in every second of the 3 min
5 Our experimental apparatus—displaying all the possible choices on the screen—makes the restriction
to integers a necessary one. Having the minimum choice be 1 guarantees that the unique optimal choice in
our CP and control treatments is to select 1, provided that one believes that players in the past all select 1,
which is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
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interval). While it is impossible to rule this out for subjects who change their
choices during the experiment, we point out that our main classification of naive
players is one that does not rely on any assumption regarding switching patterns of
play. Further, in Sect. 4 (see Finding 5) we describe an alternative method for
identifying naive types, which yields results comparable with the ones obtained
using the main classification criterion.
The third issue is whether the stakes in our CP treatment were high enough to
ensure that the desire for the monetary prize dominated systematic non-pecuniary
preferences, which is an important premise of induced value theory. Indeed, since
every second of the 3 min interval is equally likely to be selected for payment,
subjects face arguably small stakes at any second during the CP treatment. Our results,
however, show that the distribution of final choices in the 30 (180) s control treatment
and the CP treatment at second 30 (180) are statistically indistinguishable, which
suggests that the change of stakes had no significant effect on the observed behavior.
Finally, we note that our experiment is the individual decision problem rather
than the game. Indeed, our subjects are guessing the 2/3 of the average number
chosen by eight subjects in the past and, therefore, choices made by subjects in our
main treatments do not affect payoffs of those who played the game in the past. This
transformation from the game into the individual decision problem is necessary to
guarantee that the CP protocol is incentive compatible and, importantly, it preserves
the essence of the 2/3 guessing game both in terms of subjects’ goal and the framing
of the task.
3 Naive and sophisticated players
In standard choice data, that is in data that only asks for final choice alone, one has
no information as to whether the decision made by a subject was the result of
random choice or the result of a deliberate thought process. In other words, final
choice does not adequately summarize strategy, particularly if learning is taking
place. To illustrate this point, Fig. 1 presents three individuals whose final choice is
the same (33), and who would be classified as L1 thinkers if only their final choice
was observed. However, the manner in which they arrived at this final choice is
dramatically different, and may contain information of value in understanding their
behavior.6
Finding 1 More than 45 % of the population is naive.
As we described earlier choosing a number above 64 is a weakly dominated
action. We use this strong theory-driven cutoff to define naive players. Figure 2
presents the histogram of the last time each subject chose numbers above 64. For
instance, someone who never chose numbers above 64 is counted in the 0 bin on this
graph, while a person whose final choice is above 64 appears in the 180 bin.
About 40 % of subjects never chose a number above 64. However, it is plausible
that some subjects make first choices that are instinctive, before even internalizing
6 All complete paths of choice are presented in the Online Appendix.
150 M. Agranov et al.
123
the structure of the game. Thus, we define naive subjects as those who chose above
64 at some point 40 s or more into the experiment.7
According to our definition, 46.7 % of subjects are naive players. This may
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Fig. 2 Last time each subject chose numbers above 64 in the CP experiments. Note for example, if a
subject is in the ‘‘0’’ bin it means that he has never chosen a number above 64. A subject is in the ‘‘20’’
bin if the last time he chose a number above 64 was at second 20
7 All the qualitative results in this paper follow through if we instead choose 60 or 90 s as the cutoff for
defining naive subjects.
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subjects may never choose numbers above 64. Yet the proportion is consistent with
other work that studies different games, such as Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker
(2008), Ivanov et al. (2010) and Agranov et al. (2012).
One may ask at this point whether we really need CP data to identify naive
players. The answer is unequivocal: if one were to look only at the last choice made
by subjects, all that is possible with standard choice data, about 10 % (5 subjects) of
subjects made choices above 64. Hence, without the CP data, one is likely to
dramatically underestimate the proportion of naive individuals in the population.8
Finding 2 Naive players average close to 50 (a) at the end of the game and
(b) throughout the game.
Consistent with the standard assumption on naive play, 50 is within the 95 %
confidence interval for the mean final choice (the mean is just above 43.5, and the
median is 41).9 We now consider the behavior of these players throughout the game.
Summary statistics on naive play are presented in Table 1. Over the course of the
entire experiment, the average choice of naive players is 51.6 and the average
choice of naive players remains fairly stable over the course of the experiment. In
addition, the group of naive players spends close to a third of the time on choices
above 64 throughout the whole experiment.
The first three panels of Fig. 3 depict the histograms of all the choices made by
naive players in the first 60, second 60 and third 60 s of the experiment, treating
each choice for a given subject as an independent observation. In the last panel, we
present the average choice of naive players during the course of the experiment
along with the 95 % confidence interval for the mean choice.
It is quite striking that 50 is within the 95 % confidence interval for average play
of the naive types over 90 % of the time. These players average close to 50
throughout the experiment. Hence they fit the intuitive conception of naive players
through most of the period of play.
Our criterion to determine the naive subjects is the play of a weakly dominated
strategy. This does not in itself have strong implications for the path of choice.
Certainly, it does not imply that choices for the naive types should remain constant
at close to 50 over the course of the experiment. We interpret the result as providing
Table 1 Choices of naive players
Naive players
Mean choice Time above 64 (%)
Seconds 1–60 53.2 (15.6) 38.1
Seconds 61–120 50.3 (11) 26.6
Seconds 121–180 51 (14.4) 35.8
Standard deviations in parentheses
8 If subjects who are naive play uniformly over the action space, then we would expect that at the last
second of the game about one third of those naive subjects choose a number above 64. In our data, we find
that this fraction, 22 %, is slightly lower than one third. This indicates that while naive players average
50, they do not necessarily play uniformly.
9 See Online Appendix for the histogram of final choices.
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Fig. 4 Choice over time: average data with fractional polynomial regressions superimposed
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robust support for the assumption that naive players choices average 50 not only at
the end of the game but throughout the game.
Finding 3 Sophisticated players’ choices decrease over time.
In this section we focus on those subjects who never or almost never choose
weakly dominated actions. We refer to these subjects as the sophisticated subjects.
Figure 4 displays the average choice as a function of consideration time as well
as the fitted regression lines using fractional-polynomial formulations in the CP
treatment for those two groups. The coefficient on time in a random effects linear
regression model shows that sophisticated players substantially decrease their
choices over the course of the experiment (the coefficient on time is is 4.6 % and
significant at the 1 % level), while naive players decrease their choices only slightly
(the coefficient on time is 1.7 % and significant at the 1 % level).
Table 2 presents some statistics on the sophisticated and naive types. What is
clear from Table 2 and Fig. 4 is that these types differ in aspects that are in some
way removed from the defining criterion of playing a weakly dominated strategy.
While time of first choice does not differ between these groups, naive subjects
‘‘change their minds’’ and switch numbers much more often than the sophisticated
subjects. Further, the naive subjects keep changing their minds almost to the end of
the experiment, which is not the case for the sophisticated ones. The statistical
analyses of the above claims were conducted using Wilcoxon rank sum and
Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests, with one observation per subject and a significance
level of 5 %. In other words, our sophisticated subjects, while not defined that way,
seem to converge faster to a final decision, making their decisions possibly more
deliberate than those of the naive ones.
4 CP and other beauty contest games
In this section we present findings suggesting the value of the CP data in other
settings. We first compare behavior in the CP treatment with that in 2/3 guessing
tasks with distinct time constraints and show that the CP protocol does not interfere
with choice. Finally, we present results suggesting that the CP protocol may be able
to identify naive players in a broad class of games for which there is no weakly
dominated strategy. We refer the reader to the Online Appendix for a detailed
literature review of the papers that explore the connection between contemplation
time and choice in guessing games. The most related papers are those of Weber
(2003), Kocher and Sutter (2006) and Rubinstein (2007).
Table 2 Some statistics on sophisticated and naive players
Naive players Sophisticated players
Average choice 51.6 (21.3) 33.6 (16.4)
Average time of first choice 6.5 (3.5) 7.8 (5.6)
Average total number of switches 51.2 (56) 9.3 (18.6)
Average time of last choice 162.9 (29.4) 97.4 (68)
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Finding 4 The CP protocol is equivalent to a series of time constrained decision
problems.
By definition, a subject can play an unfamiliar game one and only one time. This
poses a challenge for those seeking to understand how the contemplation period
interacts with the final decision. For one so interested, the standard procedure
(between subject design) requires the use of separate pools of subjects for each time
constraint, which is rather costly.
The CP experiment is designed to elicit from one individual an entire sequence of
time-constrained choices in their very first play of an unfamiliar game. The extent to
which this design provides information on how time constraints impact play
depends on whether or not the choices it gives rise to are different than those in the
corresponding sequence of time-constrained decision problems.
Table 3 displays a powerful similarity between the CP and control experiments of
equivalent horizon (p[ 0:10 in both Wilcoxon rank sum and Kolmogorov–Smirnov
tests, where we use one observation per subject).10 Finally, the results at 180 s in the
CP treatment and in the 180 s control treatment are not only similar to one another,
but also similar to those identified in the pioneering work of Nagel (1995) and Ho
et al. (1998).
We conclude that indeed there are strong similarities between CP data and data
on the corresponding sequence of time-constrained decision problems. To a first
approximation, the CP treatment appears to be equivalent to multiple guessing tasks
with different time constraints. In addition to allowing one to economize on the
number of plays, using the CP treatment to explore the impact of time constraints
removes the need to control for individual differences: the players are one and the
same regardless of the time constraint.
Finding 5 The CP protocol can be used to identify naive players based on switching
patterns.
Table 2 showed that naive players that we identify with our dominated strategy
methods tend to make many switches and to keep changing their choices until the
end of the experiment. In games where there is no weakly dominated strategy, this
suggests the possibility of identifying naive players directly off the pattern of
switching behavior.
Table 3 Summary statistics of choices in control and CP treatments (standard deviation in parenthesis)
and in prior literature
# of obs Mean choice Median choice
30 s, control 66 42.8 (20.1) 42
30 s, CP 60 41.7 (20) 42
180 s, control 62 36.4 (20.2) 33
180 s, CP 60 36.7 (18.8) 33
Ho et al. (1998, p ¼ 0:7) 69 38.9 (24.7) NA
Nagel (1995, p ¼ 2=3) 67 36.7 (20) 33
10 More evidence is presented in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 5 shows the distribution of standard deviation of choices in the second half
of the experiment. As Table 4 shows, a relatively high variance in choice is
negatively correlated with being sophisticated according to the weakly dominated
criterion.
While our experiment was not designed with the ‘‘convergence’’ criterion in
mind, sophisticated players can be identified by using behavioral switches, and it
may be possible to use measures of convergence to identify naive players in other
games. Such measures are likely to be game-specific and to be guided by specific
theories of strategic decision making.
5 Conclusions
We introduce a new experimental protocol to provide information on provisional
choices in games, and hence the process of decision-making. We implement our CP
treatment in the decision problem that closely mimics the essence of 2/3 guessing
game and use it to identify naive players. We find that there is a high proportion of
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Fig. 5 Standard deviation of choices in the second half of the experiment
Table 4 Relationship between playing above 64 and standard deviation in second half of the experiment
Correlation w/sophistication
(no play above 64)
% Who don’t
play above 64 (%)
No. of
observations
Sophistication (Std. dev ¼ 0) 0.41 87.5 16
Sophistication (0 \ Std. dev  10) 0.34 76.2 21
Sophistication (10 \ Std. dev  20) 0.49 12.5 16
Sophistication (Std. dev [ 20) 0.39 0 7
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observation period, and that they differ in systematic fashion from the remaining
sophisticated players. The CP methodology may be useful in understanding patterns
of strategic play in a variety of other games.
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